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More Anecdotes Deployment of the EB-66Bs From Europe to Thailand
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Not An Affiliate Program. by Charles Schaufler I was with the original EB-66B deployment from Chambley, France to Takhli RTAFB Thailand. We were given cover orders sending us TDY to Moron AFB, Spain with variations authorized. We spent a few days there qualifying in air refueling. We departed on Oct 14,1965 for Mobile, AL. Then on the 15th to California with in-flight refueling over Texas. Then on the 16th to Hickam AFB, Hawaii, on the 17th to Guam and the 18th into Takhli. This route was chosen so at no time were we over anything but US territory or water, since the electronic defense of Europe was contained in those aircraft (EB-66B). One aircraft landed in Bermuda after a refueling mishap. (Capt Law). I had to return to California on the leg to Hawaii when I lost the engine hydraulics on the left engine. They fixed it and I arrived in Takhli on Oct 21,1965. After a week of orientation we flew our first combat missions on Oct 28,1965. All our missions were over DRV. For quite a while our families were not notified where we were at. Even the finance at Toul was asking if we were at war with Spain since that was supposedly where we were at and yet we were drawing combat pay. I was with Det 1 from its formation to Jan 25, 1966. Reconfiguration of the EB-66B Brown Cradle EW Equipment by Paul Duplessis In Fall 1965, shortly after the EB-66B "Brown Cradle" aircraft arrived at Takhli from the UK, the 41st TEWS Commander asked me to get familiar with the ECM systems on the aircraft. After obtaining operational information from the EWOs, the EB-66B ECM Maintenance Chief took me to an aircraft on the flight line to show me the physical layout of the ECM equipment on the pallet in the bomb bay. This included determining which jammers were powered by the alternators on each aircraft engine. It became obvious that the jammers were located on the pallet according to equipment type, e.g., the L-band, S-band jammers, etc. were next to each other on the pallet. In some cases, all the jammers in a particular frequency band were powered by a single engine- driven alternator. Therefore, if an engine failed during a mission, all jammers powered by that particular alternator would be inoperative. Why is this important? Because one of the top priority threats to the attack aircraft was the information provided by enemy height-finder radars. It so happens that ALL the jammers capable of jamming NVN height-finders were wired to the right engine alternator. I briefed my findings to the commander and operations officer and recommended that the jammers be relocated on the pallet such that an equal number of jammers of each type be allocated to each alternator. Needless
to say, this was objected to by both the EB-66B operations and ECM maintenance
officers. The operations officer objected because the current equipment configuration
had been used for years in support of Combat Operations Plans in Europe for the
past several years. The maintenance chief objected because it would take at least
a day to reconfigure each aircraft. After several discussions, the 41 TEWS Commander
and operations officer agreed with the recommendation and the changes were completed. Implementation of the EB-66B "Pathfinder Program" by Charles Schaufler I was with the
6460th from May 26, 1966 to Aug 19, 1966. Capt. Bob Green I completed 100 missions over DRV in Aug and then went to RF-4C at Shaw. I have more information on the crash at Pleiku (Capt. Robert Mann was the pilot). Also our first a/c shot down over DRV was an RB-66C (Capt. William H Means was the pilot and he and the navigator Hubbard were captured and released in 1973). Have more information on that also. He was downed by a "suspected" SAM site.
How EB-66Bs Got Into the Bombing Business by Charles Schaufler Bob Green (F-105 jock) Bill Mahaffey (my EB-66B navigator) and I were sitting in the club one night and Bob was explaining all the problems they had with dive bombing. For example, if a 3,000 pounder did not release more than likely the F-105 would mush into the target with the bomb. If all 750 did not release, it caused the A/C to roll due to the asymmetrical loading. There also was a problem finding the target in marginal weather. Add to this the fact we were short on bombs and they were now required to retain the bombs on aborted missions and land with them. This was causing problems and accidents. Bill then jokingly said to Bob that we could do a better job with K-5 radar and system on the EB-66B. Bob said OK prove it. We did not have bomb tables to use to figure when to tell him to release his bombs because they never dropped their bombs from straight and level. Headquarters approved a test flight for us using the range at Sattaheep, Thailand. On the day of the test, we went in at 23,000 feet and released 3 bombs with his wingman scoring the hits. The first one hit 50 feet short, the second one was on target, and the third one 50 feet long. When
the results were reported, the EB-66Bs were in the bombing business. The EB-66B
was regularly leading fighter bombing platforms over the MuGia Pass and another
area. BDA proved EB-66Bs effectiveness and were continued. See
Photo By about mid-1966, EB-66Bs were out of the Pathfinder business. Land based radars calibrated on the target areas and took over the job. Let's Not Forget The Enlisted Crewmembers by Erik Hermanson I was a young Airman
2nd Class recently arrived at RAF Alconbury in 1962 assigned as an T-33 crew chief.
One day Personnel asked me if I would like to earn an additional princely sum
of $55.00 a month if I would volunteer for a new program called Aerial Engineers
on RB-66's. Thus virtually increasing my pay 50% I quickly said yes! The Day the 460th TRW Commander Got Embarrassed by Paul Duplessis By Fall of 1965, the effectiveness of the EB-66C missions had been recognized by the Secretary of Defense and our unit (41st TEWS) in Thailand was given high priority for any assistance we needed to support our mission. Many VIPs began visiting our unit, including: a senior Ph.D. analyst from WSEG and Major General K. C. Dempster, of the 1965 Air Staff Dempster Committee, accompanied by a dozen AF Colonels. Their primary mission was to review our unit's EW operations & resources, to identify any shortfalls or problems, and to help us any way they could. As soon as we were notified of the Dempster Committee's itinerary, our unit called the 460th TRW to reserve the wing commander's plush conference room for our meeting with the general and his entourage. We were told that the room wasn't available because the wing commander was going to brief the Dempster Committee in that room. When General Dempster and his team arrived, the 460th Wing Commanding Officer and I met the visitors as they debarked from the transport plane. The Wing CO introduced himself and invited them to the wing headquarters building for briefings. General Dempster said his team was there to visit the 41st TEWS and asked for Captain Duplessis. I immediately introduced myself and told him that we had made preparations to brief the committee in our operations briefing room near the flight line. General Dempster said fine lets go and we proceeded to our briefing room. It was no where near as plush as the wing conference. Needless the say, the Wing Commander was quite disappointed and embarrassed. The committee was briefed on all phases of our unit's mission activities and we offered five EW system modifications that I had prepared in the form of Qualitative Operational Requirements (QOR). Within 45 days, we began receiving equipment modification kits in response to the QORs. This was the first time in the ten years that I had been involved with the EB-66 at Shaw AFB, that we got such fast and effective responses to the numerous QORs we had previously submitted. Copyright © 2002-04 All rights reserved. |